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Those of us who ttade in contemporary French philosophy are
supposed to be able, at the drop of a hat, to tick off the various
symptoms of modernism's demise: the death of the subject, of credible
metanarratives, of reason and truth. We encounter this expectation
because many of those figures whom we study and deploy are
supposedly caught up in the wide net cast by the postmodern. Yet
most of us would follow many of these figures and greet
pronouncements that "we" are done with modernity with great
skepticism-and righdy so.
Howeyer, a case can certainly be made (as many of these same
contemporary French philosophers and cultural critics do) that we
have come to occupy a distinctive relationship toward certain impulses,
notions, concepts, and ways of being that in some sense can be
characterized as "modern." I want to make a case here for this sense
of postnlodernity. To borrowa figure from ·d1e later Heidegger, could
one signpost of modernity be a "fourfold" made up of man, his raced
and sexed others, bis divine other, bis animal other-placed in a certain
configuration? In this configuration, man occupies the center, while
his others surround him like a network of mirrors that reflect him
back to himself, thus securing bis boundaries. A distinctive relationsbip
to death, desire and embocliment (among other things, including time
and being, arguably) links and separates one from the other. It is this
configuration-perhaps even this fourfold-that is disintegrating in
our time. And we are struggling to bear (tn the sense of carry and
bring to birth) whatever will take its place.
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I am particularly interested in the roles played by religion and by
sexual and racial differences in the constitution and sustenance of this
fourfold, in its passing away, and in whatever will come to replace it.
Fully describing this fourfold is beyond the scope of this paper, as is
the laying out the trajectory of its emergence. But familiarity with any
of the epochal narratives that describe the shift from medieval notions
of order and authority to modern notions of the same should suffice
to sketch its outlines in broad strokes. One can think, for example, of
the displacement of Christian authorities by the authority of
autonomous scientific reason as signaling the emergence of man as
modernity's centerpiece. The emergence of new taxonomies of nature
and the sciences that attempt to fix them inplace is partof that narrative.
These include certain taxonomies of human beings-racial and
sexual-that call upon "nature" as their guarantor and that are shored
up by science and pseudo-science. (Here, I am thinking of the
pseudosciences of race from phrenology to The Bell Curve and those
of sex, including the mad dash to identify a genetic cause for
homosexuality.) It may go without saying-but shouldn't-that these
cultural shifts have had profound material effects in the circulation of
capital (financial, psychic, fleshly) via individual and social identities
constructed by force, by discipline, by the circulation of capital itself
Religion, racial and sexual differences are at once participants in
and victims of this epochal shift. Christian theology and philosophy
of religion still bear the marks of the constraints imposed on religion
by shifting notions of authority. That legacy can be read in the division
between faith and reason, the equation of religion with morality, the
emergence of fundamentalism, etc. The genesis of the field of religious
studies (which takes a descriptive rather than prescriptive approach to
religious diversity) lies within the development of new human
taxonomies and capitals. Similarly, the very categories of racial and
sexual difference within which most of us have come to take up our
places are products of this modern era-as are the particu1ar forms of
racism, ethnocentrism, sexism, and heterosexism that are among the
features of and impetuses behind their production.
What, then, leads me to suggest that this fourfold-or this version
of it-might be passing away or disintegrating? Again, I can only be
schematic. I described the modern configuration of the fourfold as a
set of mirrors reflecting man back to himself and thereby seeuring
him. Perhaps the fact that we can now see this configuration as a hall
of mirrors signals modernity's passing. Man's others have provided a
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transcendental ground that made man possible. But we are coming to
see that that ground is also transcendent in another way: each of man's
others transcends man-in the sense of exceeding bim and bis
mastery-and the boundaries of the four-fold. And perhaps it is that
sense of transcendence that also provokes the disintegration that we
are struggling to bear. The boundaries between man and his others are
permeable; they leak. Movements for justice in the name of man's
others (raced, sexed and animal) are arguably markers of that
permeability. On the heels of permeability comes proliferation. Our
canon of sexual idel1tities has expanded to include transgendered,
bisexual, as weIl as lesbian and gay-and that canon continues to expand.
Race, too, proliferates and morphs. You will recall the debate as we
geared up for the 2000 census over the categories for race, which were
far too monolithic to capture complex and multiple lineages and
identifications. Race, ethnicity and religion become intertwined here,
as weIl, as those who attended arecent presentation on Arabs, Muslims
and the census at the annual meeting of SPEP in October of 2004
leamed.1
These events themselves signal the complex re1ationship between
"post" and "modern." They depend very much on modern ideals,
identities and institutions even as they ttansfigure and trouble them.
And modern ideals can turn on those who would invoke them to new
ends. Witness the impaling of affirmative action programs on the
fencepost of presumptive equality. I worry about the rush to ground
homosexuality in taxonomies of nature-especially genetics---given
the developing science of genetic manipulation.
Things do not get any simpler wl'len we turn to religion's place in
our current cu1turallandscape. Predictions from Freud and others that,
as modern man grew into his maturity, religion would go the way of
the dinosaur have not materialized. Religion adapted to modernity. To
some extent, modern versions of religion still predominate.
Fundamentalisms~Christianand Islamic-are the products of
modernity; direct or indirect reactions against its displacement of
religious authorities and its excesses. But modern forms of religion
also seem to be passing away. The so-called mainline Protestant
denominations-themselves creations of modernity-are in decline.
New kinds of churches (mega churches, butalso smaller fringe churches
of various constituencies) are taking their place. And religious pluralism,
brought to consciousness by modernity, is no longer about those who
live "out there" but is right l1ere. Memphis, where I live, still has churches
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on every corner and synagogues invarious sectors of the city, but now
also boasts mosques, Hindu and Buddhist temples, etc.
In what follows, I will explore some of the more intriguing, if
sometimes ttoubling, signs on our horizon in terms of this fourfold,
importing resources from French and French-inflected philosophy in
order to do so. What I will offer is at best an attempt to sketch out how
one might use these resources to understand and intervene in that to
which these signs bear witness. I will focus on one pole of the fourfold:
the one that runs between man and animal. However, as I hope will
become apparent, to focus on this pole is hardly to ignore the other
poles of the fourfold; their ttaces will be visible. I am focusing on
man/animal in part because it seems such a salient spot to start, given
current events.
Let me mark this talk with three signposts: (1) I will call the first
''War Images." The line between the animal and the human has been
invoked in at least two places in the current wars: one of the Bush
campaign's ads depicted the terrorists as a packof wolves prowling the
perimeter; and among the photos of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib is
one depicting a prisoner positioned like a dog on a leash. (2) I will call
the second signpost "Genetic Images." Arecent cover of Time magazine
repotted the discovery of the God gene; a few years ago, the press
similarly heralded the discovery of the so-called gay gene (both are
highly problematic journalistic shorthand symbols to say the least).2
We could add to these images research into genetic causes of various
diseases, the cloning of Dolly, the sheep, and now the first dog.3 (3)·
This leads us to the third signpost, which I will call "The Ufe of Animals
and Humanimals." In recent years, we have witnessed a proliferation
of books, both fiction and nonfiction, that purpott to get into the
minds of animals.4 The market for such books has emerged as pets
have become members of the bourgeois family replete with their own
stores ("Petco, where the pets go"), gourmet bakeries, and day cares.5
As some animals seem to become more like humans, some humans
are actively seeking to become more like animals. A documentary on
the Discovery Health channel recendy featured people who undergo
extreme body modifications in order to physically resemble animals
(I'm calling them humanimals): domestic cats, llzards, leopards.6
What do these images and events tell us about the fourfold?
And what roles do religion, sexual and racial differences, play within
them? What resources does French philosophy offer us as we attempt
to parse these signs and wonders? Apart from the occasional passing
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reference to other philosophers, my focus here will be on an essay by
Jacques Derrida entitled ''The animal that therefore I am (more to
follow)."7 This essaywas originally delivered at a colloquium on Derrida's
work held at Cerisy-la-Salle in 1997. I heard him give aversion of it in
the fall of 1998 at a seminar at New York University on animality. The
topic of the ten-day colloquium at Cerisy, the autobiographical animal,
was suggested by Derrida as the follow-up to two previous colloquia
held at Cerisy on his work: on the Ends of Man (1980) and on Border
Crossings (1992). This latest colloquium is linked to the first two: it
queries the confines that purport to contain man by questioning the
border that separates man and animal.
Derrida begins his essay by invoking an experience that, no doubt,
many of us whose households include cats have had, but probably
haven't thought about: what happens when your cat looks at you-
naked-in the bathroom? For Derrida, at least, this experience is
accompanied by shame, embarrassment--especially if the cat has a
frontal vie\\T. Before whom or what is he ashamed? Animals, after all,
are supposedly distinct from humans because they are not naked. More
to the point, they don't know that they are naked; thus they are not
ashamed (fhe allusion to the story of the Garden of Eden in Genesis
is intentional here and will become a theme later). Conversely, clothing
is considered proper to the human. It is intrinsically connected to other .
distinctively human proper(ties): technicity, consciousness, and
conscience. It is as though the abyssal gaze of his cat reflects Derrida
back to himself as the 'man' that he is at least supposed to be. He
writes: "the gaze called animal offers to my sight the abyssallimit of
the human: the inhuman or the ahuman, the ends of man, that is to
say the border crossing from which vantage man dares to announce
himself to himself, thereby calling himself by the name that he believes
he gives himself" (81).
This border between man and animal is first and foremost a
linguistic site in several senses: language creates the border (man, Derrida
says, "corrals allliving things" under this one term, "animal" [397])
and does so by naming. Language is also what man has that he claims
the animal lacks. Derrida coins a neologism to name this episteme:
"J'animot." He writes, ''Men would be first and foremost those living
creatures who have given themselves the word that enables them to
speak of the animal with a single voice and to designate it as the single




Trus terrain, where man separates himself from the anima!, is
perhaps the founding site of philosophy, Derrida suggests, noting that
philosophy seems to take for granted-and reinforces, for the most
part-this fundamental division, at least on the surface. Exploring this
site takes Derrida, as it does Giorgio Agamben, into the pre-
philosophical, if youwill-that is, back to ancient religious myth.8 Both
thinkers return to the creation stories in Genesis, each of which delineate
man from animal via language.9 In the first story, God teils the flrst
human couple (both the man and the woman, products of a
simultaneous creation, are addressed here) to "fill the earth and subdue
it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the
air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth" (Gen. 1.29,
NRSV). In the second story, wbich is the more interesting to Derrida,
God brings the animals to 'adam to be named.10 Trus god is not what
Martin Heideggerwould call the god of the philosophers--notThomas
Aquinas's immutable, impassable, all-knowing entity. Trus god seems
finite; he waits to see what Adam will do--and seems not to know in
advance. He wants to watch, to be surprised. Caught in the gaze of
this god--caught gazing at this god-provokes in Derrida the same
vertigo provoked by the gaze of bis cat.
Another abyss also opens up here: the story of the naming of
the animals occurs within the same mythological narrative that accounts
for the origin of sin. Derrida writes:
It is paradoxically on the basis of a fault or failing in man
that the latter will be made a subject who is master of
nature and of the animal. From within the pit of that
lack, an eminent lack, a quite different lack from that he
assigns to the animal, man installs or claims in a single
movement what is proper to him (the peculiarity of a
man whose property it is not to have anything that is
exclusively bis) and bis superiority over what is called
animallife. This last superiority, infinite and par excellence,
has as its property the fact of being at one and the same
time unconditional and sacrificiaL (388)
Trus way of thinkingaboutman-and about animal-will prove
foundational and difficult to shake. The possibility of the auto-bio-
grapbical arises here, ried intrinsically to confession from Augustine to
Rousseau and beyond with Descartes' fgO cogito ego sum in the middle,
"wait[ing] for us with his animal-machines" (389). Trus myth remains
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the mise-en-scene within which the so-called last philosopher of man,
Martin Heidegger, thinks Dasein.
However, says Derrida, in the last 200 years, we have been living
through a tectonic shift, of sorts, in man's relationship to the animal.
Symptoms of this shift include the macroscopic and microscopic
changes in what we call animal husbandry-incredibly efficient, deeply
invasive technologies of animal breeding, feeding, slaughtering and
processing that produce maximum pounds of tender meat at minimum
price for human consumption; the use of animals in scientific research
(the mapping of the human genome was preceded by maps of animal
genomes); the usually unintended but no less dramatic animal
"genocides" (Derrida's term, and its use is part of the problematic of
the essay) from human damage to the environment and human attempts
to repair the damage, and so on.
These changes produce reactions in the human body politic as
weIl (the animal rights movement, People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals [PETA], the slow food/organic food movements, etc.). And
they register at the philosophicallevel. Derrida recallsJeremy Bentham's
famous call to change the terms of the question regarding the line
between human and animal. The question isn't whether animals know;
think, speak, or respond (that is, are of the genus zoon Iogon echon), but
rather: Do they suffer? The answer most of us would give (even if
some might not see animal and human suffering as identical) is: yes.
Derrida asks us to spend some time with this tectonic shift: thinking it
through ungrounds the traditional discourse of man/animal. The very
terms of the question shift from one of possessing (or not) certain
powers/abilities to a question of passivity and powerlessness--inpouvoir;
if you will (the French captures the nuance better), of sufferance,of
undergoing/going under. And our animal mirror, in this case, I think,
shakes NS up by reflecting that impouvoir that resides within us. The
opposite of mastery, to be sure, that hallmark of modem subjectivity.
Derrida is not proposing here that there is no difference between
man and animal after all; that would be to ignore the abyssal gaze with
which the essay began. "The animal looks at us, and we are naked
before it Thinking perhaps begins there," he writes (374). But he does
want us to ponder for a while-to stay with, as it were-the sympathy
evoked in us by this brief recollection of these horrific tableaux. We
are engaged in a war over pity; between those who acknowledge this
experience of compassion (which, like sympathy, literally translates as
"feeling-with") and those who don't. He wants us to think the abyssal
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border itse!f. There is no simple clean line separating "man" from "the
wholly other that they call animal, for example, a cat" (380). Obscured
by "I'animo!' are the multiple differences within "the animal", "the
living"-not to mention the multiple lines of continuity and
discontinuity between "us" and "them."
With Derrida's meditations and provocations before me, I would
like to return to the three signposts I marked at the outset: the war
images (the photos from Abu Ghraib and the Bush campaign's ads
depicting the terrorists as wolves), genetic mapping (the latest "news,"
via the popular press, in genetic research), and the lives of animals and
humanimals. How might Derrida's insights help us understand these
particular signs and wonders? What do these signs and wonders say
back to Derrida?
Here is my overall thesis: all three confirm in different ways
Derrida's insight that the border between man and animal is abyssal
and multiple-and, I would add, fluid and fascinating (10 the Larin
sense of fascinans--magical and mesmerizing). What they say about
our contemporary relationship to I'animot remains to be seen.
The War Images
Violence does not consist so much in injuring and
annihilating persons as in interrupting their continuity,
making them play roles inwhich they no longer recognize
themselves, .making them betray not only their own
commitments but their own substance....[War] establishes
an order from wbich no one can keep bis distance; nothing
henceforth is exterior. War does not manifest exteriority
and the other as other; it destroys the identity of the same.ll
-Emmanuel Levinas
The war images draw the line between man and anim~between
"us" and "them." In the Bush campaign's ad, terrorists aren't humans
with political and religious grievances, however un.justified (that is,
meaning makers, responders), but cunning creatures who prowl at our
borders waiting for a chance to prey upon uso I wonder whether the
war of pity that Derrida describes as occurring around the animal
applies here, too? Is it possible to feel sympathy for this enemy? A
different relationship to death is invoked here, as weIl. These are
"people" (or are they?) who would die as well as kill for their cause. In
arecent essay, ]udith Butler asks apropos of the war on terror, 9/11,
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and the liminal status of GLBT [Gay, Lesbian, Bi, Transgendered]
people in American society, what deaths are grievable? What lives are
livable? Who is mourned, who is not?12
I have alluded to the modern taxonomies of race that funded
racisms, colonialisms, and genocides of various sorts. Had we time, I
would review with you arguments that I have made elsewhere using
other texts of Derrida's, especially on Heidegger, about the role of the
distinction between man and animal in those taxonomies.13 The war
images call upon those taxonomies and their logic. The image of the
naked soldier on a leash held by a female American soldier positions
"them"-represented by a single Iraqi soldier (presumably Muslim)-
as liminal figures.14 The figure of the Iraqi prisoner evokes several
borders: animal/human, domestic/savage, wbiteness/otherness. She
looks down at him from the masterful end of the fully extended leash.
He, lying on bis side on the floor, appears to have closed bis eyes as if
to avoid secing bis own humiliation. The Iraqi soldier seems speech-
less, without language, response-Iess. Yet he is naked-and ashamed.
His legs are bent at the hip and knee, as if to sbield prying eyes from
bis naked genitals. He extends bis right hand toward the floor to protect
bis head These are clearly human gestures, meaningful responses to
cruel and demeaning treatment at the bands of another.
These images figure "us" versus "them" as "man" versus
"animal"-but how successfully? Aren't "we" contaminated by
"them?"15 What do we make of the fact that a female American soldier
holds the leash? She, too, is a liminal figure who crosses gender lines
and bistorical periods recalling the sahibs of the colonial period who
"civilized the savages" via brutalit)r. She, like the terrorists, is presumably
willing to die-and to kill-in the name of our cause. In rendering the
Iraqi soldier less-than-human, doesn't she, too, call into question the
border between man and animal? Or, better perhaps, does the mute
appeal of the Iraqi soldier's body language evoke the abyssal border
between who we like to think we are and what we are all capable of?
Recall the psychological studies frequendy cited in early press stories
aboutAbu Ghraib that demonstrated that, placed in positions of power-
over, most subjects would administer electric shocks to the subjected.
In wbich case, how apt is it to name one side of the border "animal"





The enormous "progress" made in recent years in mapping the
human genome is indeed staggering. The popular press trumpets the
possibility of gene therapies to overcome diseases connected to
particular links in our DNA. No doubt, this utopie vision perpetuates
the modern desire for mastery over our bodies, over death and disease.
It has a dystopic counterpart: new forms of Frankenstein lurk in the
background (the specters of designer genetics and cloning). But other
dynamies appear beneath the surface. On the one hand, the resurgence
of religious rejecrlons of evolution some 150 years after the Scopes
trial signal ongoing anxiety about linking man too closely to animal.
But I also suspect there is another side to this anxiety. In recent years,
the announcements of the discovery of a "gay gene" and now of a
"God gene" have made headlines. Read beyond the headlines and you
discover how misleading they are: there is no "gene" that determines
homosexuality or religious faith. Talk to any geneticist and you will
learn that genes rarely, in and of themselves, determine anything. The
relationship between genetics and environment, nature and nurture, is
not unidirectional; it may not even be linear.16 But what is of interest to
me here are the reasons why we so want to believe that it might be. 1s
this the manifestation of a deep desire to, as itwere, "return to nature?"
Adesire, perhaps, for relief from the burden of responsibility that
comes with the modern notion of the subject as master of all he
surveys? Adesire, perhaps, to melt invisibly back into "nature," to
disappear across the border between man and animal? An embrace of
impouvoir that relieves us of respons-ibility and respons-ability?17
The Life of Animals and Hum-animals
I mentioned the plethora ofbooks attempting to describe for us
dense humans the mores, as it were, of our animal familiars, dogs and
cats. While both have been the subjeetof nonfiction essays, a seemingly
endless supply of litde gift books, and of objcts of various sotts (my
favorite is the welcome mat that portrays the world from the cat
perspective by sneaking a page out of its prison diary).18 This body of
literature attempts the impossible: it both evokes and attempts to cross
the abyssal border between man and animal. It attempts to describe
for us a sensibility and a social organization that differs significandy
from our own, yet doing so relles on a logic of resemblance and
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reflection, if only to say "is not" to our "is." This literary phenomenon
is of a piece with the compassionate response to animality that Derrida
described for us as symptomatic of the tectonic shift, though deployed
through a modern sttategy (epistemological mastery). In this body of
literature, the boundary between man and animal shimmers like a
mirage-at once abyssal and elusive, yet bl1dgeable and breachable.
And then there are the humanimals (my term). What of these
people who undergo extreme body modifications (tattooing, piercing,
implantation, tongue surgeries) in order to become, as much as possible,
the animal they want to be? The documentary I mentioned suggests
no single root to this desire: in some cases, relief from the demands of
being human; in others, desire for self-making beyond ttaditional
boundaries. Two of the humanimals in the documentary make their
livings through displaying their body modifications and performances
based on them. But other humanimals live private lives (the cat-man
pictured on the webpage describing the documentary, for example,
runs a computer repair business out of bis horne). These humanimals
have adopted a hybrid lifestyle whose liminality invokes and violates
the border between man and animal. Humanimals speak and respond
They interact with human society often quite volubly and publically
(the Lizardman describes in great detail the body modifications he has
undergone). Others consider their boundary crossings much more
private matters (the cat-man/computer programmer claims deep
intuitive connections to the animals he mimics). Humanimals, like
genetics, manifest the border between man and animal as more-than-
mere words. It materializes and disappears again before our eyes: what
is the difference between animal skinand tattooed human skin? Between
forked and unforked tongues?
Conclusions
I promised some remarks on what these signs and wonders
suggest about our relationsbip to "animot. First, certain aspects of these
images suggest that the episteme of "animot is not yet behind us. Bach
of these images requires "animot to be legible. Some of them depict
the deliberate deployment of "animot l!J man, though often with
consequences that he cannot foresee or control However, each image
also demonstrates the liminality-the hymen-like quality-of the
border-between. Iike it or not, the border seems ever more difficult to
police, much less seeure. So also the border between modernity and
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not only what will follow it, but what preceded it. Epochal borders,
too, can obscure continuities as much as they illumine shifts. Not only
does I'animot predate modernity, but the work of Gilles Deleuze and
Felix Guattari and Giorgio Agamben demonstrate that fantastical and
phantasmatic cro'ssings of the boundary between man and animal
predate Us.19 Hence, we are right to resist understanding posttnodernity
as the radically new or as the definitive demise of what came before.
The war images, for example, caution against simplistic proclamations
of the death of the subject. The conventions of mastery and otherness
remain all too ready to hand and their inherent violence easy to tape
Derrida's views on this subject as expressed in a 1981 interview
are worth repeating here: ''1 do not at all believe in what today is so
easily called the death of philosophy (nor, moreover, in the simple
death of whatever-the book, man, or god, especially since as we all
kno~ what is dead wields a very specific power)."w I do not mean to
suggest that there is no difference between our present and our past
on the matter of I'animo!. Of note is the distinctive role that new
technologies play in all three sets of images that I named as signposts.
The Abu Ghraib photographs are, at first glance, the casual souvenir
shapshots of a soldier. However, Susan Sontag argues that the digital
medium of these photographs make them "less objects to be saved
than messages to be disseminated....Where once photographing war
was the province of photojournalists, now the soldiers themselves are
all photographers-recording their war, their fun, their observations
of what they find picturesque, their atrocities---and swapping images
among themselves and e-mailing them around the globe."21 The advent
of digital photographywithits ease of ttansmissionmakes every soldier
an amateur photojournalist and renders censorship virtually impossible.
Whatever similarities the Lizardman may have with Alexis the Trotter
Ca nineteenth-century Frenchman cited by Deleuze and Guattari who
gained notoriety for attempting as much as possible to "be" a horse),
the technologies of body modification available to aspiring humanimals
now far exceed those available to Alexis. We take for granted a degree
of body malleability that is, I think, unprecedented-with effects on
our sense of subjectivity that need to be taken into account.22 Genetic
technologies are still in their infancy, but it seems clear that the advent
of genetic science has also altered our sense of subjectivity. What all
of trus portends for the future is impossible to say, but Giorgio
Agamben, at least, believes the stakes are high. He writes:
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Perhaps not only theology and philosophybut also polities,
ethics, and jurisprudence are drawn and suspended in the
difference between man and anima!. The cognitive
experiment at issue in this differenee ultimately coneems
the nature of man-<>r more precisely; the produetion
and definition ofthis nature; it is an experiment de hominis
natura. When the differenee vanishes and the two terms
collapse upon each other-as seems to be happening
today-the difference betweenbeing and the nothing, Iicit
and illicit, divine and demonie also fades away, and in its
place something appears for which we seem to lack even
aname.23
My reading of the signs and wonders that have been my focus
here stops short of Agamben's apocalyptic conclusions. However, I
think he accurately identifies the depth and breadth of I'animofs reach
and the abyss that opens at its end. How we will come to terms with
that end-if indeed that is what we face--only time will tell.
Rhodes College
Notes
1 I am referring to Sarah Gualtieri's paper, ''Imagining an Arab Raee:
v.s. Census Classification and Comunity Identity:' which was presented at a
panel on "How Raee Counts: Arabs, Muslims and the Politics of Visibility in
the Diaspora" at the annual meeting of the SocietyforPhenomenology andExistential
Phi/osopJry [SPEP], Memphis, Tennessee, 30 Oetober 2004.
2SeeJeffreyKluger, "The GodGene," Time, Vo1164, No. 17 (25 Oetober
2004), 62-72.
3 Gena Kolata, "Beating Hurdles, Scientists Clone a Dog for a First:'
New rork Times, 4 August 2005. The dog, an Afghan hound named "Snuppy"
(South Korean National UniversityPuppy) was birthed byits surrogate mother,
a Golden retriever. The article itself offers an inttiguing glimpse into the
various permutations of the line between man and animal. Dogs are more
difficult to clone than virtually any other animal (including humans) for a
number of reasons (complex genetie makeup, previously unpredictable
ovulation cycles, etc.). The scientists claim a humanitarian aim in pursuing
dog cloning: the cloned dogs could be used for medical research. In support,
the author notes that the discovery of insulin and the advent of open heart
surgery, for example, were the result of experiments with dogs. A critic of the
project, bioethicist Nigel Cameron of the Chicago-Kent College of La\\',
sees dog cloning as a "dry tun for the human cloning debate" because dogs
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are considered by many to be part of the family. Two ironie asides: an American
company, Genetic Savings and Clone of Sausalito, CA has been trying for 7
years to clone a dog (apparently envisioning a business in the cloning of
family pets). No luck yet, but they just opened a branch (!) in Madison, WI.
The e-version of the article featured an ad for a new show on the history
channe~'~pe to Man," inwhich an exasperated chimp says to the man sharing
bis park bench and bragging about how far back "man" goes, ''This is about
evolution again isn't it? I've just got two words for you: missing link. Found it
yet??" and grins. Both are wearing identical business suits and ries and the
chimp is reading the newspaper.
4 Two examples from the New York Times bestseller lists in recent
years are Elizabeth Marshall Thomas' non-flction book The Hidden Lift of
Dogs (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1993) and Paul Auster's novel Timbuktu
(New York: Picador Books, 1999), wbich is told from the perspective (using
omniscient narration) of a dog recallingbis life with bis first owner, a homeless
man, as he searches for a new home.
S There is now a magazine for dog owners called "Bark" that offers
excellent articles on understanding your dog (a non-anthropomorphizing
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a tattoo artist herself whose body is tattooed to look lik.e a cat (see <http://
tattoos.com/katzen.htm> and <http://tattoos.com/enigma.html>; forpictures,
see <http://W1VW.prickmag.net/enigmaJeature.html>).
7 Jacques Derrida, "The anima! that therefore I am (more to
follow)," Criticallnquiry 28.2 (2002): 369-418; ''L'animal que donc je suis (a
suivre)," in L 'animalautobiographique:AutourdeJacques Derrida, ed. Marie-Louise
Mallet (paris: Galilee, 1999): 251-301. Page references (to the English
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days cu1minating with the creation of human beings (Genesis 1:1-2:3). The
second story (Genesis 2:4-3.24) takes place in the Garden of Eden and centers
on the creation and fall (according to Christian tradition) of humankind.
10 This is a place where other poles of the fourfold appear; in this
case, man's sexual and divine others. We tend to think of "adam" as a masculine
proper name (mdeed, it has become one in English). However, the term
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means "human being" in Hebre\\T. As Phyllis Trible and other commentators
have noted, sexual differentiation does not occur in this second story until
God makes the woman out of c;adanls rib. The terminology changes at this
point to ish (man or husband) and ishah (woman or wife). Trible translates
'adam as "earth creature" to capture both 'adam's sexual neutrality and the
connection to 'adamah, Hebrew for dirt, out of which God makes 'adam. See
Phyllis Trible, Godandthe Rhetoricof Sexualiq (philadelphia: Augsburg Fortress
Press, 1978).
11 Emmanuel Levinas, Totali~ andInftni~: An Essq)' on Exterioriq, trans!.
Alphonso Lingis (pittsburgh: Dusquesne University Press, 1969), 21.
12 Judith Butler, "Violence, Mourning, Polities," in Precanous life: The
Powers of Mourning and Violence (New York: Verso Books, 2004), 19-49.
13 See my Deconstruction, Feminist Theology, and the Problem of Difference:
Subverting the Race/GenderDivide (Chieago: University of Chicago Press, 1999),
156-63 and 169-74.
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originally published in print by the Washington Post, tbe copy at their website is
the elearest. See "More Prison Photos" in the sidebar at <http:/ /
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-sro/world/iraq/abughraibswornstatementJ042104.html>
15 One of the soldiers in the 1972 documenta~ "Winter Soldier:'
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